The normativity problem starts with the following broad picture of reasons and rationality (Broome 2005 , Kolodny 2005 ). On the one hand, reasons are 'external'. What you have reason to do does not supervene on your non-factive mental states. So for instance, the fact that there is petrol in your glass can be a reason for you not to take a sip, even if you do not believe it to contain petrol. On the other hand, rationality is 'internal'. If you believe your glass contains gin, it may well be rational to take a sip, because of this belief. 3 In this way, what rationality requires of you can come apart from what reasons require of you. You might be rationally required to take a sip, although you have most reason not to. Nonetheless, we can ask whether you must have at least some reason to A, if you are rationally required to A. Call this the reasons question.
However, the picture makes it plausible that the answer is negative. If you are rationally required to intend to take a sip, that will be because of certain mental states.
For instance, it might be because you believe that you ought to take a sip, or because you intend to drink gin and think that taking a sip is necessary for doing so. But beliefs and intentions are not the kinds of things to be reasons to take a sip, on the above picture. And if what is in your glass is petrol, you seem not to have a reason to take a sip -taking a sip will be seriously unpleasant and harmful.
( 1999: 67) . And according to Mark Schroeder, 'to be normative, is to be analyzed in terms of reasons ' (2007: 81) . Many other writers share something like this picture:
reasons are the basic normative unit, and the rest of the normative is to be explained by appeal to facts about reasons. Call this the reasons first approach to normativity. 5 As examples of the approach in action, consider the following analyses:
Ought For it to be the case that you ought to A is for you to have more reason to A than not to A.
Good
For A to be good is for there to be reason to value A (cf. Scanlon 1998 
The Subjective Reasons Account
However, the reasons first approach does not make a positive answer to the reasons question compulsory. Consider the subjective reasons account of rationality. According 5 Other influential writers attracted to the approach include Scanlon (1998) and Dancy (2004 (Parfit, forthcoming: 36) . This view is naturally suggested by reflection on the kind of case described in section one. Suppose you are in the kind of situation in which you ought to be drinking gin, and you believe your glass to contain gin. Then you may be rationally required to intend to take a sip, even if your glass contains petrol. This might be what makes most sense, from your perspective. The explanation seems to be that you believe something -that your glass contains gin -which, if true, would give you conclusive reason to take a sip.
More generally, the subjective reasons account claims that to be rational is to respond to subjective reasons -believed propositions that would be reasons if true. There are many complications involved in developing an adequate account of this sort. 7 But for the most part, the simple account just sketched will be adequate here:
Subjective For you to be rationally required to A is for it to be the case that you would have conclusive reason to A, if your beliefs were true.
On this view, it is very plausible that the answer to the reasons question is negative. If you are rationally required to A, then if your beliefs are true, you will have reason to A. But if your beliefs are false, you might not. However, the subjective reasons account should not claim that, because of this, rationality is not normative. The reasons first approach says that rationality is normative if rational requirements are explained in terms of facts about reasons. But the subjective reasons account does explain rational requirements in terms of facts about reasons: it explains them by appeal to facts about 7 For some discussion see Schroeder 2009. what there would be reason to do, if your beliefs were true. 8 Such facts are genuinely normative -they are, for instance, the kind of facts the full-blown error-theorist is committed to denying.
This shows that even if we accept the reasons first approach, the normativity of rationality does not turn on the answer to the reasons question. The subjective reasons account answers the question in the negative, but nonetheless implies that rationality is normative. Given the plausibility of the latter claim, this is an attraction of the subjective reasons account. 
The Transparency Account
We might wonder why this point has not been more widely appreciated. My conjecture is that it is because the subjective reasons account has much in common with a different account, on which rationality seems not to be normative. This is Scanlon and Kolodny's transparency account. This account begins by claiming that there is only one basic requirement of rationality (Kolodny 2005: 557) :
Enkrasia
If you believe that you have conclusive reason to A, then you are rationally required to A.
8 Errol Lord (ms) also makes this point. 9 It is worth noting that the subjective reasons account is not the only account of rationality to answer the reasons question in the negative but explain rationality in terms of reasons. Garrett Cullity's (2008) 'standard-fixing account' is another example. If Kolodny and Southwood are right then, given the evident similarity between the subjective reasons account and the transparency account, we might expect the subjective reasons account to have the same result -that rationality is only apparently normative.
11
I think this is a mistake. It ignores a further important difference between the accounts. As we have seen, the subjective reasons account explains rationality in terms of facts about reasons. To be rationally required to A is to believe things that would give you conclusive reason to A if true. So the subjective reasons account reduces rational requirements, in part, to facts about what there is, or would be, reason to do. By contrast, the transparency account reduces rational requirements to purely psychological facts. To be rationally required to A is just to believe that you have conclusive reason to A. But to explain rational requirements in terms of beliefs about reasons is not to explain them in terms of reasons. So rationality is normative on the subjective reasons account, but not the transparency account.
We can clarify this point by recalling the heuristic suggested above. Consider an error-theorist motivated by the putative queerness of the normative. If the transparency account is correct, such an error-theorist could accept that there are rational requirements.
For it is no part of the error-theorist's remit to deny that people believe they have reasons.
11 Kolodny (2005: n.47) appears to accept this inference.
But if the subjective reasons account is correct, the error-theorist must deny that there are rational requirements. For the proponent of the subjective reasons account thinks that there are non-normative propositions that are reasons if true. For instance, he might think that the proposition that there is gin in your glass is a reason to take a sip, if true. And this is something the error-theorist must deny. So the error-theorist should worry about rational requirements on the subjective reasons account, but not on the transparency account. Rationality is normative only on the former.
Subjective Reasons and Enkrasia
The argument so far may seem too quick. For it is not clear that the subjective reasons account implies that all rational requirements are normative. For instance, consider the requirement Enkrasia. As I noted, it seems to follow from Subjective that this is a rational requirement. This is because if you believe that you have conclusive reason to A then, trivially, you have conclusive reason to A, if your belief is true. But now notice that even the error-theorist can accept that if this belief is true, you have conclusive reason to A. So even the error-theorist can accept Enkrasia, if Subjective is true. So, by the heuristic above, the requirement Enkrasia is not normative, on the subjective reasons account.
My response to this objection begins by denying Enkrasia. Since Subjective implies Enkrasia, we must also deny Subjective. But as noted above, Subjective is only a first pass at a plausible subjective reasons account. The question is thus whether a better developed version of the subjective reasons account will imply that all rational requirements are normative. We cannot properly answer this question without working out such an account -a task that is beyond the scope of this paper. 12 But I will offer a ground for optimism on the part of the subjective reasons theorist.
A problem with Enkrasia is that it implies that even if you irrationally believe that you have conclusive reason to A, you are rationally required to A. This is implausible. If you irrationally believe that you have conclusive reason to A, Aing may itself be irrational. But it is implausible that you can be rationally required to do the irrational. To come at the point another way, it is implausible that if you drop the irrational belief and do not A, you fail to do something rationality requires of you.
13
A more plausible version of Enkrasia -one that an adequate subjective reasons account might imply -says that if you rationally believe that you have conclusive reason to A, then you are rationally required to A. However, it is plausible that the subjective reasons account will explain such requirements, in part, by non-trivial facts about reasons. This is because whether you rationally believe something depends on a range of your other beliefs and mental states. In particular, on the subjective reasons account, it depends on mental states whose contents are, or would be, reasons for this belief, and on the absence of states whose contents are, or would be, defeaters for this belief. Now the crucial point for our purposes is that some of these states will have non-normative contents. But this means that we have returned to the kind of facts about reasons that the error-theorist is committed to denying. The error-theorist cannot accept that nonnormative facts are reasons, or defeaters, for belief. So if such facts are always part of the explanation of why, in a given case, you are rationally required to A, then all rational 12 For some initial steps, see Schroeder 2009. 13 For this way of putting the point, see Brunero forthcoming.
